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Guy Standing’s (2017) The Corruption of Capitalism gets it wrong from 
the very beginning: the title suggests that the social ills emanating from 
capitalism should be ascribed not to capitalism working according to 
plan, but to something, somewhere along the way, having gone wrong 
with capitalism, in the movement from truly free markets to their 
disfigured progeny. It is never clear whether Standing wants to rid 
capitalism of its perversions, and thereby restore markets to their purified 
form, or whether this ethical-moral framing is a rhetorical strategy—a 
form of immanent critique – aimed at exposing the hypocrisies of those 
proselytizing the free market creed. At times, Standing sounds like a 
cross between Noam Chomsky and Milton Friedman. It is this schizoid 
movement from left to right and back again – a dialectical intertwining –
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that gives rise to what one might call Standing’s centrist libertarianism. 
He borrows from both right and left, ultimately serving up a strange 
ideological brew, advocating for the idea that markets should be made 
free, restoring the welfare state of postwar social democracy, freeing all 
manner of “commons” (from nature to intellectual property), enclosed 
within a universal basic income scheme. Common to all these proposals 
is the idea that capitalism can still be redeemed. 
 
 Standing is the originator of the concept of the precariat (Standing 
2011), and he has, following the financial crisis, become a leading 
intellectual of the European left. It is therefore well worth paying attention 
when Standing offers a synthesizing appraisal of some of the 
predominant social trends of our times. He does this with flair. The book 
takes a look at six key areas: subsidies and tax breaks, debt and credit, 
new enclosures of the commons, the on-demand economy (Uber, 
Airbnb, TaskRabbit, etc.), and the hijacking of the democratic process by 
the rich. As such, the book covers a lot of ground. Standing writes with 
equal gusto about the veritable explosion in patents (more than 10 
million patents worldwide in 2014, valued at $15 trillion, or 20 percent of 
the world’s GDP [p. 52]), the swelling ranks of a trailer park subproletariat 
in the United States (20 million people, or six percent of the population, 
live in trailer parks there [p. 148]), and the decimation of labor markets 
with the rise of the on-demand economy (with an estimated 200 million 
people worldwide predicted to supplement their incomes by performing 
online “tasks” by 2025 [p. 218]). 
 
 What gives this wide-roaming work some semblance of 
coherence is the central concept of rentier capitalism. (At times, Standing 
also speaks of crony capitalism, and he largely uses the terms 
interchangeably.) Rent, of course, is not the same as profit, and so to say 
that capitalism has entered a rentierist phase is to make a claim about 
the shifting nature of income from profit to rent. In classical political 
economy, rent is income from owning land. Adam Smith’s tripartite 
division of income into rents, profits, and wages was meant to explain 
and reflect the triadic social structure of landlords, business owners, and 
laborers. On the view of contemporary mainstream economics, rent is 




“unearned revenue,” that is, revenue that is not, somehow (and this is 
where things get tricky) deserved. By the 1980s, some Middle-Eastern 
and African nations were described as rentier states, seen to have 
derived a significant share of their national income from the good fortune 
(or undeserved luck) of having had large deposits or reservoirs of natural 
resources located within their national boundaries (see e.g. Skocpol 
1982). Such windfall earnings were seen to be purely arbitrary and 
contingent: the economic success of Saudi Arabia was and is in large 
part due to the scarcity of oil, or the “extra returns that firms or individuals 
obtain due to their positional advantages” (Bebchuk and Fried 2004: 62), 
as rents have latterly been defined. Implied in such judgments was the 
idea that rent-derived income violated basic Western norms about just 
deserts, a departure from the Protestant spirit and tacit self-
understanding of capitalism: wealth should be the result of risk, merit, 
and hard work. Rents are viewed as the opposite of all of that, first by 
certain neoclassical economics, and now also increasingly by leading 
intellectuals of the left, from Standing to Žižek. Standing’s emphasis on 
the purported shift from a profit-oriented capitalism to a rentier capitalism 
is merely the latest chapter in a longstanding attempt to establish a 
certain symbolic distinction between pure, proper profit-seeking and 
debased rent-seeking. 
 
Rent-seeking is said to be behavior geared towards racking up 
such “unearned,” or undeserved, revenue, often held to arise out of the 
manipulation of government. It is “the use of the resources of a company, 
an organization or an individual to obtain economic gain from others 
without reciprocating any benefits to society through wealth creation” 
(Investorpedia 2017). But rent-seeking is a troubling concept. As 
MacGregor (2014: 261, n. 78) notes, it has been a “central premiss of New 
Right theory.” British neoliberals developed the theory of rent-seeking in 
the context of an ideological struggle against the purportedly distorting 
effects of unionization on labor markets (Plehwe 2009: 29). The concept 
presupposes that we can distinguish between, on the one hand, 
detrimental revenues that do not contribute to society and that rely on 
improper relationships between private entities and the state, and, on the 
other hand, beneficial profits that contribute to the addition of human 




welfare. As Pasour (1987: 123) points out, however, “[S]ince the 
appropriate role of the state is normative, identifying a particular activity 
as wasteful must necessarily be based on norms that lie outside of 
economic theory.” In other words, rent-seeking is in the eye of the 
beholder: one person’s rent-seeking is another’s boon to human well-
being. To label an action as rent-seeking is to impose a negative 
evaluative judgment on it; it is not, strictly speaking, an analytic act. 
 
Standing, of course, is not alone in this. Max Weber distinguished 
between Gewinn (profits) and Rente (rent), corresponding to worthy and 
unworthy capitalists, respectively. Weber spoke of the degeneration of 
capitalism as it slid from entrepreneurialism to rentierism (Weber 1994: 
68), with “rentiers” being “a stratum of people who just draw dividends 
and interest, without doing mental work for it, as the entrepreneur does” 
(Weber 1994: 292). Weber remarks that the French are a nation of 
rentiers, that the literary class in Germany is a “parasitic” group living off 
rents (Weber 1994: 84), that rentiers are individuals “living off paper 
investments” (Weber 1994: 114), that is, “someone whose income is 
entirely unearned” (Weber 1994: 319). But again, Weber’s distinction is 
castigatory, not analytical. The concept of rent, as Weber uses it, is a 
moralistic device for disapprobation, not a stringent analytical concept 
that helps make sense of capitalism. And Standing follows the old 
master’s missteps. 
 
Markets are always embedded in the state. The state produces 
markets. Wherever markets are, there, too, are the tracings of an activist 
state. The assumptions inherent in the concept of rent, or “unearned 
income,” is that there can be such a thing as a pure economic exchange, 
a relationship between a buyer and a seller that is unadulterated by 
relations outside “the market” as such: indeed, that there has ever been 
such a thing as pure, autonomous markets in the first place. Thus, when 
labor-sellers and labor-buyers confront each other on the market, so 
neoclassical economics holds, in the absence of unions and other 
perturbing features, a “true” wage level can be established, free from the 
distorting power of an entity outside the market. But buyers and sellers 
interact within a wider totality of social relations preexisting their 




contractual relationship. Cultural norms, laws and regulations, and the 
state in the entirety of its being, necessarily give rise to a particular way of 
going about economic exchanges. Markets, as Bourdieu (2005) shows, 
arise out of the operations, both symbolic and material, of the state. 
There are no such thing as pure markets, as Polanyi (2001 [1944]) long 
ago recognized, understood as undistorted, autonomous entities. 
Markets always arise out of the state. The state makes markets, willing 
them into being and upholding them through regulatory and auxiliary 
activities (including such things as setting up a particular legal and 
educational system). 
 
 That is one side of the problem with the concept of rent-seeking. 
But rent-seeking also presupposes the ability to think of profits as 
beneficial or constructive. Rents represent corruption, but profits are pure, 
so the argument goes. This is why it is so important for Standing to stick 
to his story about “crony capitalism” as the central driving factor in recent 
economic history, a history defined by “rent seeking through cosy 
relations with government” (p. 45). The attraction of the concept of rents – 
and the cronyism said to go with it – is that it leaves the idea of 
capitalism as such untouched. It establishes an implicit dichotomy 
between a pure, profit-driven capitalism and a corrupted, rent-seeking 
sort of capitalism. If capitalist relations today are characterized by rent-
seeking, which means improper relations between state and private 
enterprise, the point is to return to an original position, which means 
retuning to profits and getting away from rents.  
 
There are multiple problems with this view. First, it neglects the old 
Marxian idea that profits derive from exploitation and are as a result 
inherently problematic—all profit ultimately derives from the toil of really-
existing laborers, a kind of theft from the value-adding activities of 
workers, as Marx drives home in Capital. Second, it present an overly 
conspiratorial view of political economy. Thus, Standing writes, “[T]he 
most insidious way in which crony capitalism is extending its grip 
[is] political manipulation by the plutocracy and elite, who are funding 
politicians and political parties to favour the interest of rentiers” (p. 46). 
Now it would be misleading to deny the influential role played by 




business interests on the political process across the Global North, from 
the Koch Brothers to Davos and beyond. But is this the essence of the 
story about capitalism’s ascendancy and potency in our age?  
 
Standing is almost forced to elevate rent-seeking to a central 
analytic concept because the fundamental premises of the book are that 
capitalism has become corrupted, that it can be saved, and that the way 
to go about rescuing capitalism is to abolish (bad) rents and promote 
(good) profits. Rentierism is a logical, necessary commitment once one 
has settled on the idea that there is something terribly wrong with 
capitalism but that this cannot lead us to abolish capitalism tout court. 
(Interestingly, this axiomatic misstep seems at least partly the result of 
pressure from the book’s publisher. As Standing [2016] himself admitted 
in the course of a public talk, the title of the book was originally intended 
to be Rentier Capitalism, but “my publishers said: it has no sex appeal. I 
want you to be able to sell your book in airports, you know, all over the 
place, and rentier capitalism, nobody really understands. Not even 
economists. And [my editor] came up with a title…“How about ‘The 
Corruption of Capitalism’?”) 
 
One of the great benefits of the concept of profit is that it has an 
observer-independent existence. Profit is essentially surplus-value 
appropriated by capitalists. It requires no special normative commitment 
to identify profit. Rent, on the other hand, requires that we become 
ethicists, that we establish distinctions between earned (or legitimate) 
revenues and unearned (and therefore illicit) income. But is there such a 
thing as an ethically sound capitalism? On the contrary, one of the most 
sensible corollaries of the Marxian approach is that nobody comes out of 
capitalism with their hands clean. Even the most green, compassionate, 
and “sustainable” investment funds are implicated in destructive actions 
through the all-encompassing relationality of markets. Under capitalism, 
everything truly is connected with everything else. Capitalism is 
inherently rhizomatic, a latticework held together very tightly indeed. 
 
Can we imagine such a thing as a “non-cronyistic” form of 
capitalism? On the contrary, all capitalists are dependent on the 




regulatory efforts of the state. All capitalists must, in some sense, 
maintain a cozy relationship with the state. This isn’t first and foremost 
restricted to having figures like the Koch brothers lobbying for tax breaks 
conducive to their material interests. Rather, capitalism and the state are 
conjoined in what Polanyi called “market society.” As Polanyi (2001 
[1944]: 204) recognized, however, the “separation of politics and 
economics” is an “outstanding characteristic of market society,” an 
ideological figment that portrays markets as existing in a purified state.  
 
Standing claims democracy is being undermined by rentier 
capitalism. The plutocrats are in control. Wealthy rentiers have a material 
interest in turning the state towards their ambitions, and they have the 
money and clout to do so; politicians stand to gain a great deal from 
making deals with rentier capitalists. But as usual, Standing takes this 
analysis much too far. He claims that “the result” of the symbiotic 
relationship between rentier capitalists and politicians is a “disengaged 
citizenry, a decline in voting, [and] collapsing political party membership” 
(p. 242). Surely wealthy elites alone are not to blame for political apathy. 
That is too agentic a view, one that ascribes too much power to a 
discrete set of individuals. One quite obvious example that disproves 
Standing’s thesis is the case of Donald Trump, a plutocrat who, whatever 
else one has to say about him, has energized millions of citizens, on both 
right and left (for very different reasons). It just isn’t true that the billionaire 
class has a necessary material interest in passivizing the public: 
generating huge outpourings of public enthusiasm could just as well 
serve their narrow agenda. 
 
To make his rentier thesis work, Standing is forced to do some 
heavy airbrushing of capitalism. Thus, Standing claims that in the on-
demand economy (Uber, Airbnb, TaskRabbit, etc.), workers now own the 
means of production, while the capitalists are turned into rentiers, 
because they “just” control the platform. “Labour brokers [i.e. the owners 
of on-demand services] are rentiers, earning a lot for doing little, if we 
accept their claim that they are just providing technology to put clients in 
touch with ‘independent contractors’ of service” (p. 239) But why should 
we accept their claims at face value? Part of the struggle over these 




technologies has been precisely to point out that defining workers as 
contractors is one of the primary methods of exploitation – because it 
frees employers of important social, economic, and legal obligations. (A 
class-action court suit filed in California in 2013 turned on this very point, 
and other lawsuits are being filed across the United States to challenge 
Uber’s definition of drivers as contractors instead of employees.) And yet 
Standing is forced to accept this argument prima facie, because to admit 
that the owners of Uber are also the owners of the “means of production” 
– that is, equating the platform to the means of production – would mean 
that they are earning profits, as per Marx, because they’re skimming off 
surplus-value, rather than extracting rent from a control of “the 
commons.”  
 
The idea of rent, and its basis in the notion of commons, thereby 
becomes a sort of fetish, a method of conceiving the world, to be 
defended at all costs, no matter how implausible the outcome. Standing 
caps off his discussion of the on-demand economy by making “the 
systemic point…that incomes from labour and work are dropping for 
most people in and around the precariat, while rental income is 
mounting fast” (p. 240). Instead, we should say that wages are declining 
and profits are increasing. Rent doesn’t enter into it. We don’t need to 
shoehorn each and every phenomenon to fit with the concept of rent. 
Profit, surplus-value, and wages will do just fine. 
 
Standing’s fundamental assumption, then, is that capitalism is a 
general category of which rentier capitalism (or plutocracy) is a subclass. 
Standing repeatedly assumes that rentier capitalism involves making 
money from assets or capital: “In sum, the institutional architecture of 
rentier capitalism has created a fearsome edifice for siphoning income 
into the hands of the plutocracy, an elite receiving income from capital, 
and some other favoured groups” (p. 83). But this definition—plutocrats 
as an “elite receiving income from capital” – is Marx’s definition of 
capitalists. There is no capitalist who is not simultaneously a plutocrat, in 
Standing’s analytical (and castigatory) sense. If we are to follow 
Standing’s definition of rentier capitalism and rentier capitalists, all of 
capitalism and all capitalists must be seen as participants in the category 




of rentierism. Thus, if we follow Marx, Standing’s central, axiomatic idea – 
that a “pure” capitalism can be established over and against a 
“corrupted” form of “rentier” capitalism – must be said to collapse. 
 
Standing’s commitment to the idea of a truly free market has some 
perverse effects. It forces Standing to oppose the idea of a minimum or 
living wage. “While a minimum wage (and its new variant, a ‘living wage’) 
may set guidelines of decency, they do prevent a free market from 
operating.” (p. 235) And this is meant to disqualify the idea of a minimum 
or living wage. Certainly, there are good reasons to be wary of the 
minimum wage. It is clearly not a panacea against all social ills. Norway, 
one of the world’s most successful examples of a well-functioning 
welfare-capitalist society, doesn’t have a minimum wage, and for good 
reasons: labor unions prefer negotiating a sector-by-sector “tariff” wage, 
rather than a minimum wage, claiming that a minimum wage tends to 
become a de facto maximum wage in certain sectors (cleaning, 
construction, transportation etc.). But notice that this is not an argument 
about the possibility of creating a truly free market. There is no such thing 
as a truly free market, because markets are always embedded in wider 
relations of political economy (the state, regulations, subsidies, taxation) 
and symbolic-cultural forms (norms, attitudes, preferences, ways of life). 
There is no way out of these relations. But Standing’s centrist 
libertarianism prevents him from seeing this. 
 
Sometimes Standing comes off as a stodgy complainer, as when 
he bemoans the “noise pollution in public spaces by commercial 
interests,” exemplified by “muzak” (p. 179), or the commercial billboards 
that he apparently has seen in Warsaw used to advertise underwear. The 
steady drumbeat of lamentations can get wearisome: is Standing’s vision 
of universe really so joyless? One-sidedness is also a kind of falsehood. 
 
 Even when Standing gets it right, he somehow also gets it wrong, 
He is critical of independent central banking. Previously, governments 
were free to set interest rates. But one of the central tenets of neoliberal 
ideology has been to cut central banks loose. Thus, in 1997, Gordon 
Brown, Chancellor of the Exchequer, gave the Bank of England the 




freedom to set monetary policy. “Henceforth, the bank’s Monetary Policy 
Committee (MPC), although nominated by the Chancellor, was free to set 
interest rates based on loose guidelines.” (p. 115) So far so good. But 
then Standing writes, “This soon led to penetration by special interests.” 
(p. 115) Standing’s monomaniacal framing of all world events is that of 
the conspiracy theorist, always seeking out the veiled machinations of 
“special interests.” The problem, as Standing sees it, is one of playing fast 
and loose with ethics: “…throughout history, banks have been vehicles for 
amoral behaviour, fraud and corruption” (p. 114). Where leftist critics 
have seen a transfer of power away from elected officials to unelected 
technocrats (who are equipped with a particular set of optics, a way of 
perceiving the world that decidedly favors certain powerful, wealthy 
strata of society), Standing sees the absence of ethicality. Even as 
Standing gets the problems right, he gets their conceptual underpinnings 
wrong.  
 
Standing also falls into the nativist trap. Standing claims that in 
some London neighborhoods, most properties “are foreign-owned” (p. 
126). But why would a British-born capitalist class be better? The 
problem is not that the owners are non-British, but that the British 
property market is extremely exclusionary – and all the more so in 
London: in 2015, more than 90 percent of England and Wales remained 
unaffordable to those whose incomes were at the national average level 
(The Guardian 2014). Standing is also critical of the sale of a “property 
empire” consisting of around 900 houses to the tune of 250 billion 
pounds “to a consortium of Arab investors” (p. 130). Once again, the 
absence of a comforting Britishness is presented as an integral part of 
the problem. But would it really be better if this portfolio of buildings were 
to have been purchased by a native-born group of landlords? Similarly, 
Standing is skeptical of the Canadian-born Mark Carney, glossed as “a 
foreigner” (p. 115), who was appointed to lead the Bank of England in the 
wake of the financial crisis in 2007-2008. “Could one imagine a foreigner 
being appointed to run the US Federal Reserve or France’s national 
bank?” (p. 116) Let’s leave aside the fact that Carney now holds a British 
passport, has been married to a British woman for nearly two decades, 
and obtained two degrees from some of Britain’s premier institutions of 




higher education. Standing’s implication is clear: only national citizens 
can promote the national interest, and foreignness is tantamount to a 
corruption of the economic, or capitalist, system. So, too, with democratic 
elections, which Standing views as being undermined by consultancy 
firms. In the case of “the Australian Lynton Crosby,” a political consultant 
active in Conservative Party politics, one salient feature, so we are told, is 
that “he was not British” (p. 267). Rupert Murdoch, we are told, is “an 
Australian-born naturalised American,” who “has never hidden his 
intention to influence British politics” (p. 275).  
 
There is a charitable way to read these frequent allusions, which is 
that power flows transnationally, and global elites do not respect neat, 
national boundaries: global nomads are those who possess cash, clout, 
and political power, and so it would be remiss not to note the “foreign” 
backgrounds of many of these figures. But there is another, less 
hospitable way to read Standing’s arguments: as a sort of national 
chauvinism, the kind of nativist sentiment one expects from the staff 
writers of the Daily Mail. His moralizing framework has a tendency to turn 
ugly in its search for an external scapegoat: parasites, or “leeches” (p. 
268), are all too readily seen to be those Others, from “a former Kazakh 
secret police chief” (p. 126) to “Arab investors,” from Canadian central 
bank heads to Australian political consultants. What makes this nativist 
sermonizing all the worse is that it doesn’t even seem like Standing is 
particularly aware that he’s doing it. His search for an agentic source of 
the Left’s setbacks leads him to castigate those pesky foreign intruders. 
At the purely factual level, this doesn’t seem like prudent social analysis: 
the vast majority of capitalists in Britain are British – and even if they 
weren’t, it wouldn’t be their passport that made them a source of social 
ills. 
 
Standing’s perspective is not that of a transnational or global left. 
The book skews towards Britain in its choice of illustrative examples, 
which is fine – all authors write from somewhere – but also in reformative 
intent. When Standing talks about ameliorating capitalism, he really 
means repairing capitalism one nation at a time. This methodological 
nationalism is ultimately incoherent because the social pathologies 




generated by capitalism transcend national boundaries. They resemble 
air bubbles caught under a plastic wrapper: push down on the bubble 
and it will simply resurface elsewhere beneath the laminated surface. To 
take an illustrative example: one of Standing’s central reform proposals is 
that all countries should establish a sovereign wealth fund (SWF), 
modeled on Norway or Alaska (both sourced from hydrocarbon 
revenues). But he seems to ignore that Norway’s oil fund makes most of 
its money from investments on the world’s stock markets; in other words, 
Norway has learned to play the global capitalist game, generating profits 
“set to benefit all Norwegians, including future generations” (p. 305), 
certainly, but to do so in a way that ultimately depends on the 
exploitation of workers and extraction of natural resources around the 
world. Sovereign wealth funds are not a way out of or beyond capitalism; 
they are not even a way of repairing capitalism’s worst excesses. 
Norway’s Global Government Pension Fund (GPFG) – the bizarrely, 
perhaps intentionally, misnamed fund (a name that fosters the false 
impression that it is used to fund future pensions, which it does not) that 
Norway controls – teaches a singular lesson: SWFs only serve to 
entrench the interests of financial capital. Standing thinks otherwise. He 
thinks SWFs can be put to good use. “Considerable redistribution could 
be achieved by putting a share of profits and rental incomes into a fund 
for reducing inequality and economic insecurity” (p. 304). But how? By 
investing in global stock and property markets, or, in other words, playing 
the capitalist game. Even though the Norwegian fund is “perhaps the 
most impressive example of long-term thinking by any Western 
government,” in the words of The Economist, which Standing quotes 
approvingly (p. 305), that really isn’t saying much in an age of extremely 
short-termist thought (item: unchecked economic growth; item: 
impending ecological catastrophe). And it doesn’t even begin to take into 
account the source of profits generated by the funds that Standing thinks 
so highly of. Sovereign wealth funds are, at least in part, participants in a 
zero-sum game: what benefits the Norwegian people, harms 
seamstresses in Bangladesh and copper miners in Zambia. 
 
Standing is guilty of indulging in what Bourdieu termed “the 
fantasy of the conspiracy,” which is the “idea that an evil will is 




responsible for everything that happens in the social world, haunts 
critical social thought” (Bourdieu 2014: 383, n. 9). From his discussions of 
the Bilderberg Group, Davos, the Mont Pèlerin Society, and others, 
Standing largely ignores the structural reasons why the social-
democratic project ran aground, preferring instead to emphasize the 
individualistic, organizational, micro-agentic sources of neoliberal 
transformation. Once again, this theoretical framing is a necessary, 
logical misstep arising out of Standing’s commitment to the very idea of 
rentier capitalism: if capitalism has entered a rentierist phase, that means 
wealthy, powerful individuals must be responsible for our current 
predicament, rather than blind social forces. “The main reason for rentier 
capitalism gaining ground is that powerful rentiers have ways of 
capturing the state and commodifying politics, while politicians can use 
rental income to indulge in clientelistic practices that help them stay in 
office” (p. 241). It is perhaps little wonder that The Economist is one of the 
most frequently cited sources in Standing’s book (at one point, Standing 
admits that “The Economist’s liberal instincts are in this instance correct,” 
[p. 278], but he frequently leans on the center-right magazine for 
empirical and conceptual support). For his worldview is increasingly that 
of a centrist libertarianism, that is, a coupling of a progressive critique of 
domination with a rightwards-tilting fetishization of markets that must be 
made truly free. To those who believe capitalism is not corrupt but 
inherently limiting and limited, Standing’s perspective cannot help but 
seem problematic. For those readers, the challenge is instead to move 
beyond an ethical framing of capitalism’s woes and devise an entirely 
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